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Abstract Members of political parties may influence each other. For example, a liberal
in a party of moderates may moderate his views. At the same time, the moderates in the
party may become more liberal. Voters in a district who favor such effects may care about
the ideology of officeholders in other districts. They may therefore prefer a candidate who
affiliates with a party over an independent with the same position.
Keywords Elections · Parties · Social networks
Notation
Mj Membership of party j
n Number of districts other than the one under consideration
Vi Ideal point of voter in district i
Vj0 Initial ideology of candidate from district j
Vj1 Induced ideology of the MC from district j
w Weight in voter’s utility function reflecting externality from MC’s ideologies in other
districts.
λ Weight affecting MC’s induced ideal point
1 Introduction
This paper uses ideas from social networks to explain why voters may prefer a candidate
who joins some political party over an otherwise identical candidate who joins a different
party or no party. It considers a political party as a social organization, with its members
influencing each other. A voter may dislike having the district’s representative swayed by
the views of other party members. But a voter may want representatives from other districts
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to move closer to the voter’s ideology. The balance of these two opposing effects can make a
voter prefer a representative who joins a party. The paper makes several contributions. First,
it shows how a candidate can win votes by joining a party. Second, the analysis has member-
ship in parties endogenous—a candidate will join the party that maximizes his popularity
within his constituency. Third, it allows the parties to form endogenously. In particular,
rather than taking the ideology of parties as given, the paper shows that in equilibrium two
parties may form, one on the left and one on the right. Fourth, following Krehbiel (1993),
the analysis allows a political party to influence behavior, rather than merely to agglomerate
like-minded officials.
Of course, many other papers, including those surveyed below, consider the electoral
benefits of political parties. Some, but not all, of these explanations satisfy an important
criterion formulated by Krehbiel (1993). He notes that legislators who share preferences or
other motivating factors will naturally show voting patterns that appear consistent with party
behavior, independent of the party’s existence. Thus, it is important to distinguish “party-
like” behavior from changes in behavior caused by parties. My approach does this.
2 Literature
Others have studied the electoral benefits to a candidate of joining a political party. One
approach emphasizes that a political party can commit to future policy.1 Others see parties
as long-run players that discipline candidates with short horizons. Alesina and Spear (1988)
model a political party as an infinite sequence of overlapping generations of finitely-lived
politicians; they describe a transfer scheme between a candidate and the party which al-
lows a party’s current and future candidates to commit to a moderate platform and thereby
to increase electoral success. Harrington (1992) demonstrates how explicit commitment is
unnecessary: a trigger strategy can allow parties to sustain moderate platforms.
The benefits of party formation in a legislative bargaining game are modeled by Jackson
and Moselle (2002): if legislators propose policies in random order, then legislators who
bind themselves to make proposals that benefit each other will enjoy higher expected utility
than when each acts independently.
A different approach emphasizes how party membership informs voters. Thus, Snyder
and Ting (2002) view a candidate as inclined to join a party with members whose posi-
tions are similar to his. Party membership then informs voters of the candidate’s positions,
and therefore with risk-averse voters increases his electoral popularity. Caillaud and Tirole
(2002) interpret parties as information intermediaries that select high-quality candidates.
2.1 Peer-group effects
Experimental evidence shows strong social influences on individual judgment (e.g., Sherif
1935; Festinger et al. 1950; and Asch 1951). A fine survey of this literature is Marsden
and Friedkin (1993). Data also show the existence of social influences on the behavior of
politicians. Fenno (1978) speaks of a legislator’s personal constituency, which includes fel-
low legislators, as influencing him. Several authors examine friendship among legislators,
finding that a legislator is especially likely to befriend legislators of the same party, and that
friends are more likely to vote the same way on roll-calls. In a study of 93 members of the
1For example, Levy (2000) and Baron (1993) assume parties are constrained in their platforms, thereby
increasing their power when they bargain over forming a coalition.
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Ohio State Legislature in 1993, Arnold et al. (2000) find that friendship increased shared
voting, even after controlling for party and shared ideology.2 In the early 19th century, fra-
ternities of congressmen nested in boardinghouses functioned as voting blocs; patterns of
roll-call voting reflected the social networks derived from congressmen’s social lives (Young
1966).
In the four legislatures Wahlke et al. (1962) study, members sought friendships within
their own parties. And legislators who chose each other as friends tended to agree on roll
calls. In the California Assembly, legislators who happen to be assigned seats next to each
other tend to vote alike (Masket 2008). In the Iowa legislature, shared partisanship increases
friendship (Caldeira and Patterson 1987). More generally, a person’s beliefs can depend on
the beliefs of others (Kuran 1995), and preferences may be endogenous (Becker and Mur-
phy 1988). Friedkin (2003) formulates a social networks model of mutual influences, and
describes experimental evidence supporting it. The ideas are applied to politics by Shleifer
and Murphy (2004), who consider networks with mutual influences among their members.
Like them, I find that in equilibrium political platforms can diverge, but unlike them I show
how an individual politician benefits from joining a party.
Aldrich (1983a, 1983b) sees party activists as concerned about the ideological stance
of the party, and supposes that voters who find that the location of one party’s activists are
closer to their own preferences than that of the other party may become activists themselves.
That in turn moves the location of the average party member in the direction of the new
activist, which further affects who will join the party. The aggregation of the decisions of
party activists may thus generate stable equilibria in which the two parties have different
ideologies. My model also examines endogenous choice of which party to join. But whereas
Aldrich views each party member as atomistic, I allow a legislator to consider how his own
partisan choice affects the ideologies of other legislators.
3 Assumptions
I shall consider elected officials who benefit from joining a party because of the influence
of party membership on other party members. For convenience, I speak of voters and candi-
dates, with each candidate aiming to maximize his popularity with his district’s voters, and
therefore joining the party the voters prefer he join. Similar analysis applies under a citizen-
candidate model,3 in which an elected official maximizes his own utility. The more detailed
assumptions are given below.
3.1 Voters
A voter’s preferences are single-peaked over a one-dimensional policy.4 For simplicity, vot-
ers within a district are identical. Voters support the candidate whose position will maximize
the utility of voters in his district.
2The authors’ findings are, however, consistent with the reverse causality—legislators befriend others with
similar political preferences.
3See Besley and Coate (1997).
4This assumption simplifies the exposition. Under the citizen-candidate model, where an elected official
maximizes his own utility, the analysis could be extended to multiple dimensions.
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3.2 Cross-district externalities
Voters in one district may care about the ideologies of Members of Congress (MCs) in other
districts. Name by P the MC under consideration. Consider the Downsian model, where
the legislator with an ideal point at the median casts the decisive vote. Then voters in any
district want to move the preferences of the median legislator in their direction. Or they want
to move the preferences of a legislator who is not at the median so as to change the identity
of the median legislator, and thus change policy in a direction they desire. Relatedly, because
of a committee’s power, policy may be set by members of a committee on which P does
not sit. Or perhaps districts generate externalities on each other (say from pollution) and so
need MCs who see each other often or who understand each other. Membership in the same
party promotes that.
Assume therefore that a voter’s utility depends on the induced preferences of P and of
other MCs, though the voter may care more about P . More specifically, let the number of
MCs be n + 1. Let w > 0 be a parameter indicating the weight a voter places on the gap in
ideologies between P and other MCs. Indicate by Vk the ideal point of each voter in district
k; the induced ideology of the MC from district j is Vj1. Then the utility of a voter in district
k is
Uk = (Vk − Vk1)2 + w
∑
j =k
|Vk − Vj1|. (1)
Voters may not recognize how their congressman influences another. That is, they may
care about how a congressman is influenced, but not how he influences others. But the
results of the analysis below would also hold if candidates are at least partly policy-oriented,
cannot commit to not joining a party, and if after an election an incumbent decides to join
a party. The example in 2009 of Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania switching from the
Republican to the Democratic party may demonstrate this effect at work. The switch could
moderate other Democrats, to the benefit of Senator Specter.
3.3 Candidates
Each candidate, say i, has an innate ideal point, Vi0. For simplicity, the issue space is one-
dimensional. The members of party j are indicated by j ∈ Mj ; the number of members is
nj . A candidate can commit to join a particular party; the only effect of party membership
is to create mutual influences among its members.
Candidate i with initial ideal point at Vi0 who belongs to party j has induced ideal point
Vi1 ≡ λVi0 + (1 − λ)∑k∈Mj Vk0/nj . This formulation, which makes induced ideology a
weighted average of initial ideology and of the ideologies of other party members, closely
follows the formulation used by sociologists in Social Network Influence Theory (see Fried-
kin 2003).5 A candidate joins whichever party will generate a set of induced positions for
all MCs which best appeals to the voters in the MC’s district.
4 Equilibria
Several propositions give sufficient conditions for voters to prefer that a candidate join a
political party rather than work independently.
5The model can be generalized by making λ a function of nj and of the distances between the ideal points
of the MCs. This generalization would allow, for example, for stronger influences within a small group than
within a large group.
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Proposition 1 If other party members little influence a member’s ideology, then voters
would prefer that P join a party over his working alone.
Explanation: If a legislator’s membership in a party generates only small movements in
his ideology, the voters in a district are certain to benefit from his joining a party. A small
move away from a voter’s ideal point has a second-order effect on that voter’s utility. But a
small move in another district has a first-order effect on the voter’s utility.
Proposition 2 As a corollary, P benefits from joining a party which will little affect his
ideology. For example, an incumbent’s ideology may change little when joining a party
whose mean ideology lies close to the incumbent’s.
Proposition 3 If P little cares about his own ideology, but cares about the induced ideolo-
gies of others, then he benefits from joining a party.
Explanation: By joining a party, P affects the ideology of other party members, which
increases his utility. The change in his own ideology, since it stays near his optimum, little
reduces his utility.
So far I discussed a legislator’ decision about joining a party. I can also study the prefer-
ences of party members to accept a legislator to their party.
Proposition 4 If each party member suffers increasing marginal disutility from the ideology
of other members, then party members will favor a moderate joining the party.
Explanation: Consider an extreme leftist, say P , in the party. A moderate who joins the
party moves the leftists and rightists in the party towards the middle. The loss in utility to
P from a rightward movement of leftists is less than P ’s gain in utility from the leftward
movement of rightists.
Proposition 5 Current party members will oppose the membership of an extremist within
that party.
Explanation: Again, assuming increasing marginal disutility, an extremist moves the in-
duced ideology to an extreme, say to the right. The gain to rightists is less than the loss to
leftists within the party.
The result that a voter in a district would benefit from P joining a party consisting of
MCs with initial ideal points sufficiently close to the voter’s immediately suggests how
parties may form. A liberal voter gains from P joining a party of liberals, and a conservative
voter gains from P joining a conservative party. Moreover, a liberal voter who suffers large
disutility whenever P moves far from the voter’s ideal point would oppose a P who intends
to join the conservative party. In short, when the distribution of voters’ ideologies is bimodal,
an equilibrium can have two parties.
Centrists in a party gain the most from joining a party. They gain from changing the
positions of other MCs toward the center in the party. But they suffer little from their own
ideological change: centrists are pulled in opposite directions, and so their induced ideology
is close to their initial ideology. Such incentives could lead to the formation of a party
composed of centrists, with MCs at the extremes joining no party.
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4.1 Ideological parties
More challenging is showing that with an even distribution of preferences the equilibrium
can have two, ideologically distinct, parties. To see how this separation can arise, let the
ideal points of the 10 MCs lie at 1,2, . . . ,10, with lower indices representing more liberal
views. I will verify the existence of a Nash equilibrium in which MCs 1, . . . ,5 constitute
one party (“Democrats”) and MCs 6, . . . ,10 constitute the other party (“Republicans”).
Notice that voters in a district who care much about the ideology of MCs in other districts
may want P to join a party whose members have ideologies far different from the ideal point
of voters in the district. In particular, with quadratic disutility from the ideology of a different
MC, voters in a district may be desperate to move the ideology of MCs in other districts.
To avoid such behavior, which appears rare, assume that disutility from deviation by P is
quadratic, but that the disutility from the ideology of other MCs is linear.
At an equilibrium with the two parties, the induced ideology of a Democrat with initial
ideology i is








The induced ideology of a Republican with initial ideology i is








The utility of a voter in district k (for k = 1, . . . ,5) when MCs 1, . . . ,5 are Democrats,
and MCs 6, . . . ,10 are Republicans, is
U 5D5RD (k) = −(v5D5RD (k) − k)2 − w
5∑
i=1




|V 5D5RR (i) − k|. (4)
To check for a Nash equilibrium we must consider the two options for an MC who is
initially a party member. The MC can join the other party, or can work as an independent
(joining neither party). Either way, the Democratic party will consist of four members in-
stead of five. The ideology of a Democratic party member i when MC k no longer belongs
to the Democratic party is
V 4D6RD (i, k) = λi + (1 − λ)
(
∑5
i=1 j) − i − k
3
. (5)
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The utility of a voter in district i = 1, . . . ,5 when P is an independent is therefore6
U 4D5R0 (k) = −w
5∑
i=1
|V 4D6RD (i, k)−k|+w|V 4D6RD (k, k)−k|−w
10∑
i=6
|V 4D5RR (i)−k|. (6)
Lastly, consider an MC who was initially in the Democratic party but moves to the Re-
publican party. The induced ideology of this MC, k, becomes






Now that MC k is a Republican, the ideology of Republican MC i is
V 4D6RR (i) = λi + (1 − λ)
(






The utility of a voter in district k, with an MC who is now a Republican, is
U 4D6RR (k) = −(v4D6RR (k, k) − k)2 − w
5∑
i=1
|V 4D6RD (i, k) − k|
+ w|V 4D6RD (k, k) − k| − w
10∑
i=6
|V 4D6RR (i) − k|. (9)
The conditions for two symmetric parties to exist in equilibrium are that each member
prefers to belong to his party than to work alone, and that none wants to join the other
party. For a member of the Democratic party, these conditions are U 5D5RD (k) > U 4D5R0 (k)
and U 5D5RD (k) > U 4D6RR (k).
These conditions need not always hold. Thus, for λ = 1/2 and values of w which make
the MC with ideal point at 5 satisfied with membership in the Democratic party, the MC
with ideal point at 1 would gain from joining the Republican party—the MC would thereby
shift the induced ideal points of the Republicans sufficiently far to the left as to outweigh
his own shift to the right.
But a separating equilibrium can exist. Suppose λ = 95/100, and 0.125 < w < 1.53.
Then the equilibrium can consist of one party on the left and one on the right, though districts
are evenly distributed along the ideological spectrum.
4.2 Strategic voting
Voters who care much about the preferences of MCs in other districts may gain from electing
an extremist, who will cause the other members of the party to evolve toward P ’s positions.
That is, liberal voters may vote for extreme liberals. This result contrasts with the standard
6I assume for simplicity that an independent, a loner, influences no one. That is an extreme assumption.
A less extreme assumption has voters uncertain about an independent’s colleagues, so that voters poorly
predict the mutual influences, and believe that on average the independent’s induced ideology is close to his
initial ideology.
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Downsian model—if the liberal is to the left of the median, then it does not matter how
liberal he is. And my approach can generate results that may look like expressive voting.7
There is an additional complication. Suppose MCs A and B belong to the same party,
so that each moves his ideology toward (A + B)/2. If this point is a permanent position,
then voters in district A may gain from replacing the incumbent with someone whose ideal
point is at A rather than toward (A + B)/2. On the other hand, an old-time incumbent may
exert more influence, moving other MCs toward his position. And so voters will re-elect
incumbents.
5 Implications
The approach adopted here can be extended in several directions. First, the mechanism can
apply beyond political parties; it can also apply to membership on congressional commit-
tees: voters in a district may want their congressman to join a committee because he can
thereby affect the ideologies of other members of the committee.
Second, my model predicts that an MC will avoid joining a party or a coalition consist-
ing of ideologically rigid members—socializing with them will not change their opinions.
Maybe that is why the Communists were rarely accepted into coalitions.
Third, a voter’s concern about the ideology of MCs in other districts will be greater the
more likely the voter is to move, and the greater the political power of MCs from other
districts. The evidence on this is mixed. In the United States the vote shares of third parties
(such as Greenbacks, Populists, Progressives, and Prohibitionists) were more than double
their shares than now. More than five times as many third-party congressmen were elected
to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1890 to 1920 than in 1940 to 1970 (Hirano and
Snyder 2007). Comparative data on residential mobility are hard to find. But Ferrie (2005)
suggests that mobility was higher in 1890–1920 than in more recent years, which is not
consistent with mobility reducing support for multiple parties. On the other hand, a voter will
be more concerned about influencing the views of MCs from other districts when the federal
government centralizes power than when local governments exert much control. Chhibber
and Kollman (1998), examining India and the United States, indeed find that periods with
few national parties correspond to periods of centralization.
Fourth, members of a party may prefer not to join a coalition which would force them to
interact with members of other parties. For example, in 1924 Leon Blum and his Socialist
party in France supported the Radical government of Edouard Herriot, but refused to become
members of the cabinet. A similar pattern appeared in India following the 2004 elections: the
Left Front did not accept cabinet posts, but agreed not to vote against the new government.
In Israel, some members of the Agudat Israel party pursued a policy of non-contact with
Zionists, seeing in them a threat to religious purity. So though the party supported various
coalitions, it refrained from assuming cabinet positions (Arian 2005, pp. 151–152). These
examples are not unique: minority cabinets account for about 35% of all governments in 15
parliamentary democracies from 1945 to 1982 (Strom 1984). In California budget negotia-
tions of 2008, the Republican legislative leaders who negotiated with the Democrats were
ousted by Republican legislators, consistent with the idea that party members preferred that
7Expressive voting builds on the idea that an individual who realizes that his vote will not decide the election
may instead vote as an act of expressive behavior, and so can support a candidate whose policies the voter
would not want implemented. For a discussion of expressive voting, see Schuessler (2000).
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leaders not associate with Democrats. Such reluctance to join a coalition appears to contra-
dict standard assumptions—politicians seek power, whether for its own sake or to influence
policy. But the behavior can make sense under my approach. The party members outside the
cabinet may fear that the members who do join the cabinet will change their preferences.
Fifth, risk aversion and uncertainty about an MC’s ideology can also lead voters to fa-
vor candidates who commit to joining a party. To see this, suppose voters in n + 1 districts
have the same ideal point, say 0. Let voters be uncertain about the initial ideal point of
each candidate, with the distribution of a candidate’s ideal point having mean 0 and vari-
ance σ 2. The mean initial ideology of other MCs is then normally distributed with mean
0 and variance σ 2/n. With a weight of λ on own ideology in determining induced ide-
ology, the expected value of induced ideology is 0. The variance of induced ideology is
λ2σ 2 + (1 − λ)2σ 2/n, which for 0 < λ < 1 is necessarily less than σ 2. Party membership
reduces variance, making a candidate more attractive to risk-averse voters.
6 Conclusion
In discussing how party membership changes a legislator’s ideology, I argued that the con-
cern by voters about ideology in other districts may make voters favor a candidate expected
to join a party. But even if this incentive is secondary, my approach can prove useful. For
suppose parties form for other reasons—commitment, signaling, cost sharing, and so on.
The mutual ideological influences can then shape the composition of parties, and the incen-
tives to join them. For example, the main incentive for a candidate to join a party may lie
with the economic efficiencies it provides. But in deciding which party to join, the effects I
highlight may be important. Relatedly, parties will better signal ideology if peer pressures
strengthen the ideological coherence of the party.
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